Favourite sites

Tuesday, October 13, 1992

CHARLOTTETOWN - 60 REASONS AND MORE TO VOTE NO FOR CANADA'S SAKE

60 REASONS AND MORE TO VOTE NO FOR CANADA'S SAKE

A Critique of the Charlottetown Accord
October 13, 1992 self

The bulk of this pamphlet is a section by section critical commentary on the Charlottetown Consensus Report on the Constitution of August 28, 1992. The Consensus Report has been widely printed in newspapers and is being slowly distributed to most Canadians. What follows should be read in conjunction with the Consensus Report. Abbreviated accounts of what is proposed are usually tendentiously misleading. In particular, publications of the Government of Canada such as Our Future Together, which is also being widely distributed, are highly charged propaganda for the "Yes" campaign and not the objective information they pretend to be.



INTRODUCTION

The Consensus Report is long and throughout deliberately vague. At a great many points, usually indicated by an asterisk, what it means is left to be decided in a "political accord". This means more dealing between Mulroney and Clark and the premiers and with the native leaders before we can know how we are to be governed and before the politicians will return to their responsibilities. Indeed the Consensus Report provides that we shall never return to responsible government. The process of intergovernmental negotiation will be entrenched in the Constitution.

Many people rightly complained that we should have a legal text before voting in order to know what the Consensus Report really means. The "Yes" propaganda dismissed this with the argument that a legal text is just a translation of the Consensus Report into a language no one but lawyers understands. But with less than two weeks to go before the vote, while this pamphlet was being completed, a legal text, "subject to approval" has been released after all and is being waved about by the "Yes" campaign not intending that anyone should read it. The text was given to Quebec leaders four days early and leaked in Quebec but withheld from the rest of Canada "to be fair to everyone".

Because the Consensus Report is so vague, the legal text is needed to determine how much of what it means is to be left to the courts, already strained to the limit by the Charter , and how much to future negotiations. With the release of the legal text it is clear that both litigation and negotiation will be endless if the Consensus Report is approved. In most areas provisions for negotiations will be incorporated into the Constitution. The may even be litigation about negotiations, something that is already beginning. The legal text largely carries the vague language of the report into the Constitution. If it is adopted, Canada will have one of the longest and vaguest most impractical constitutions in the world.

The Consensus Report is not an agreement. Where it is vague or a political accord is required it is an agreement to disagree until the question of consulting the people can be got out of the way.

The vagueness of the Consensus Report and the legal text is a sufficient reason in itself for voting "No". But it is not the best reason. A "No" that was interpreted simply as a demand for clarification and sent the politicians back to their dealing to come back for a second referendum in a year's time would be a step forward, but it would not take us out of the constitutional woods. Canada needs a "No" that will stop the constitutional dealing for good. It needs this "No" because at every point, though it is impossible to know where the Consensus Report is taking us, the direction is wrong and points towards the destruction of Canada.

To appreciate this fully it is necessary to review the Consensus Report in detail. Those who have not the time or the stomach for this constitutional dog's breakfast can skip to page 22 for a summary of how our politicians are leading us astray.


ANALYSIS

1.
The addition of the vague general language of the "Canada Clause" to the Constitution will invite the courts to try to manage each of the broad political issues it raises, which should be left to the democratically elected parliament and legislatures in Ottawa and the provinces.

The courts have always played an essential role in interpreting the constitution. Since Confederation they have had to interpret and enforce the distribution of powers in the British North America Act . Since 1982 they have had to interpret and enforce the Charter of Rights and Freedoms . The courts' management of the distribution of powers has been difficult, but after 125 years they have arrived at a practical and clear settlement of the issues. The new responsibilities under the Charter , though in large part involving traditional legal issues of criminal procedure and civil rights, have stretched the capacities of the courts to their limits.

The courts are not capable of handling the further issues the "Canada Clause" and other proposals hand to them. By asking the courts to resolve more political issues the proposals will politicise the courts, stifle democratic responsibility and undermine the authority of the courts. The courts cannot resolve such issues efficiently and by trying to do so they will slow down the already dangerously slow administration of ordinary justice.

Most of the "Canada Clause" will seem banal and trite, though that does not mean that unpredictable dangers to democratic government will not result from it. But some of the "Canada Clause" is obviously controversial and dangerous.

The "Distinct Society" clause was at the heart of the rise and fall of Meech Lake because of its ambiguous importance. In English Canada it was presented as an innocuous statement of the obvious, merely expressing a respect for Quebec that would make it feel at home in Canada without having any practical consequences. In Quebec it was presented as the final achievement of the ambitions of Quebec nationalists: it would change everything. It is impossible to say what it would have meant through the years if Meech had passed and in constitutional litigation and political manoeuvring its meaning had been revealed. The only certainty is that both English Canada and Quebec would have been shocked or disappointed by what it meant and ill will and discord would have been promoted.

The reintroduction of the distinct society in the supreme governing clause of the Constitution will be taken by Quebec as a grant of special status. If, as we are assured by the English "Yes" campaign, it does not mean that, Quebec will be back for more in an ugly mood.

The commitment to "respect for individual and collective human rights and freedoms of all people" is a dangerous attempt to satisfy two conflicting theories of rights and freedoms. Individual and collective rights and freedoms must conflict. Though, arguably, some language and aboriginal rights now in the Constitution are collective, they are specific and limited. The inclusion of collective rights and freedoms in the Consensus Report will provide an unlimited opening for the suppression of individual rights and freedoms in the name of unspecified collectives. It throws the whole meaning of rights and freedoms in the Constitution up in the air and imperils them all.

2.
This section takes the governments of Aboriginal peoples outside the Charter . It exposes Aboriginal peoples to the violation of their rights and freedoms as Canadians by their governments claiming to act in relation to the exercise or protection of their languages, cultures or traditions. Section 43 cannot make up for this exemption.

3.
Sections 16 to 21 of the Charter already secure the rights of English and French in New Brunswick. The proposed additional provision either would have no effect or would involve the courts in managing the language, educational and cultural institutions of New Brunswick against the will of its people and would override other provisions of the Charter .

4.
A constitution should not make policy, but define the institutions and rights by which the people through their governments can make policy for their times. The proposed "Social and Economic Union" may set out objectives that most Canadians now support. But it is only the support of Canadians for those objectives that can protect them. If Canadians in the future have other priorities, the constitution cannot and should not attempt to force them to follow our priorities.

There is no statement of where the money to pay for all these good things is to be found and without a statement of the price and how it is to be paid these provisions are deceitful.

Setting out as an objective "a health care system that is comprehensive, universal, portable, publicly administered and accessible" cannot in the slightest degree assure that that objective will be met or pursued. The only thing it can do is to invite the courts to interfere with democratic government under the pretext of furthering that objective. But courts cannot and should not try to manage a health care system, to raise the money it needs or to control its costs.

The Consensus Report acknowledges this in providing that the "Economic and Social Union" is not to be enforced by the courts. But its inclusion in the Constitution can still have some effect on how the courts read other parts of the constitution. That much is admitted by the provision that it should not abrogate or derogate from the Charter . The inclusion of the Union provisions will further politicise the constitution and the courts. It will turn public debate away from the merits of policies to their supposed compatibility or incompatibility with the constitution.

Any mechanism for monitoring the "Social and Economic Union" will be an ineffective distraction from governments' democratic responsibility. Each provincial government and the national government within its jurisdiction should pursue its several objectives and answer to its legislature or parliament and the people for its work.

The Consensus Report says that a "First Ministers' Conference" should determine the mechanism. Any mechanism devised by the Premiers will just be an excuse for escaping responsibility and pointing fingers at other governments. It introduces for the first time the perversion to be entrenched by section 23. "First Ministers" have had until now no legal or constitutional authority. But if the "Yes" wins they are to be a college of sovereign princes with authority independent of the legislatures and parliament to whom they should be responsible and by whose confidence alone they serve.

Though broadly attractive the "policy objectives" are not clearly uncontroversial. What, for instance, is meant by the phrase "publicly administered" used of the health care system. Hospitals are mostly private charities financed largely, but not entirely, by government grants. Doctors are mostly private professionals, not civil servants. Is this compatible with the system being publicly administered? There are a range of models of health care systems from the British National Health Service to European systems of state regulated universal private health insurance. All face similar problems of controlling costs while offering universal accessibility. Does the health care policy objective have a bias in one direction or another? Should it?

5.
The revised subsection 36(2) changes "committed to the principle of making" to "committed to making" equalisation payments. Together with the other proposed changes to section 36, it adds to the already too great obligation of the national government to raise taxes not for its responsibilities but to subsidise the provinces, which take credit for the spending but take no responsibility for the taxing. The changes would require the national government to have "meaningful consultation" with the provinces on its equalisation legislation with the provinces: to negotiate its handouts with the recipients.

6
There was hope last year that Economic Union proposals would bring an end to the interprovincial trade barriers that make a mockery of our claim to be a united nation. But Ottawa caved in to the provincial governments and has now agreed to accommodate the trade barriers rather than forbid them. This is provided for in the "political accord of August 28, 1992", which is not being distributed with the Consensus Report.

No amendment to the constitution is needed to solve the problem as section 121 of the British North America Act provides for free trade within Canada. What is needed is the political will to apply it. Canadians have a right to free trade across the country. Instead the "First Ministers" again would set up a dispute resolution agency, such as independent states set up. This would allow the provincial governments to control interprovincial trade barriers and maintain them.

7.
An elected Senate would be only an obstructive Senate. It would gravely weaken the national government, when the giveaways to the provinces will make it more than ever necessary that within its remaining powers the national government can exercise strong leadership.

Parliamentary responsible government was historically developed and defined in Canada in the 1840's. It requires that a government with the confidence of the House of Commons should be able to pass its principal policies through parliament. An elected Senate, structured so that it must frequently have a different majority from the House of Commons, would be in regular conflict with the House of Commons obstructing and distracting and never able to act constructively. It would be irresponsible, never having to answer to the people for a coherent programme of government. By thwarting the government from time to time it would make the government irresponsible by preventing it from applying a coherent programme. The deadlock and irresponsibility that increasingly characterises American government would be imported into Canada.

The manner of electing senators will be left in important respects to the provinces. They are permitted, in the legal text, to require that an equal number of men and women be elected, a flagrant violation of democracy that would not be permitted without express constitutional sanction.

8
Many people are rightly disturbed by the proposal to guarantee Quebec 25% of the seats in the House of Commons whatever its population. What justification then can there be for making the votes of Prince Edward Islanders count 70 times more than the votes of Ontarians in an any way effective Senate? The advocates of a triple E Senate insist on representation by population in the House of Commons but abandon it in the Senate as if it did not matter there.

We either trust ourselves to govern our national affair democratically by representation by population or we do not. If we do we, have no need of an equal Senate. If we do not, we cannot solve the problem by setting up an equal Senate to fight with a democratic House of Commons.

9.
The proposal of aboriginal senators is typical of many points in the Consensus Report where issues are not resolved but open for further distracting negotiation. "Yes" will not mean an end to constitutional talks but a go ahead for more.

The proposal of a racially restricted election by a racially selected electorate is repellent. The aboriginal peoples are Canadians and should vote in Canadian elections.

The few proposed aboriginal senators would serve no useful purpose. It would simply make more complicated and uncertain the parliamentary arithmetic that the senate proposals will make the national government depend upon. The suggestion of special majority power on aboriginal issues is another instance of the racial separatism that runs through the consensus report.

10.
The statement that the Senate should not be a confidence chamber reveals a gross misunderstanding of responsible government and the meaning of the government having the confidence of the House of Commons. The need for the government to have the confidence of the House of Commons is not law or even a convention of the constitution. It is a practical necessity of responsible parliamentary government. The confidence of the House is simply its readiness to pass the government's principal measures and to vote it the money to carry on government. Without this a government cannot take responsibility for the conduct of the nation's affairs and cannot be held responsible. If the Senate is to have powers to prevent the government from carrying out its responsibilities the government will have to have the confidence of the Senate to take responsibility whatever the constitution says.

11, 12, 13 and 14.
An attempt has been made to limit the power of the Senate to obstruct government by defining four categories of legislation. In the case of money bills the Senate could only hold them up for 30 days and most other bills a joint sitting of the Senate and the Commons could pass by a majority. But elected senators, some representing as many as a million voters, would use whatever powers they had to the full. As they would have no responsibility for the good government of the country they would do as much as possible to distract the government. Legislation would be continually bogged down and fought over by senators playing politics.

"Fundamental tax policy changes directly related to natural resources[ the legal text broadens this to include electricity] " would require Senate approval in any event. What this might involve we cannot know, but if a government supported by the majority of Canadians believes that fundamental changes in the taxation of natural resources are needed, it should not be thwarted by senators who might represent a small minority of Canadians.

Legislation affecting French language and culture would be subject to a veto by French-speaking senators. The definition of French-speaking senators could become viciously controversial. The Speaker of the Senate is to rule absolutely who is a French-speaking senator and what measures they can veto. This is a dangerous power in someone elected by such an unrepresentative assembly.

In practice this provision is likely to mean that Quebec senators, elected as delegates of the National Assembly of Quebec, will have a veto on language legislation. French language rights are thoroughly guaranteed in the constitution already. The reform of the Official Languages Act and other language related legislation should not be made hostage to Quebec. Public support for bilingualism will depend on its flexibility and openness to reform. A Quebec veto on changes could threaten rather than protect bilingualism and breed resentment rather than unity

Senate approval would continue to be required for constitutional changes. The present Senate is expected to approve anything, including its abolition. An elected Senate would not be so docile. The proposed provincial constitutional vetoes will make future constitutional changes more difficult and painful than what we have been through in the last six years. The impracticality of the present package will make changes urgent in a few years. There will be no need for the Senate to have a constitutional veto if the provinces each have one.

15.
The provision for Senate ratification of "key appointments" will make a political football and spectacle of whatever appointments it may cover. Many of the best people to fill such positions will not be willing to let their lives and careers become hostages to partisan bickering. The proposal is an example of a craven emulation of American political practices that are bad in themselves and do not fit with responsible parliamentary government. Many recent American examples should have warned us off this practice.

The American system cannot work because the role of Senate confirmation is inexplicable. Where the government has a majority in the Senate, it will be able to get who it wants, who will submit to the process, appointed, but there will still be bickering and appointments will be tarnished, but go ahead anyway. Where the government does not have a majority in the Senate, the Senate will play cat and mouse with appointments and to the extent it wishes, deny the government the power to appoint people it has confidence in and undermine the government's responsibility. One of the achievements of responsible government when it triumphed in Canada in the 1840's was the ability of democratic governments to see policies administered by people they chose. The provision for Senate ratification sets back constitutional development 150 years.

The only position specified in the Consensus Report is the Governor of the Bank of Canada. This position, more perhaps than any, should not be political. On the other hand, given the centrality of the Bank's role in economic policy, it is necessary that the government should be able to chose who it thinks best to administer monetary policy. If it is unable to, it will absolve itself of responsibility for monetary policy and the state of the economy, blaming the Bank as American administrations blame the Federal Reserve Board.

Other key appointments are to be the subject of a "political accord". As with many other key elements of the revolution in our government we are being asked to approve, it is to be settled later. The government to government negotiations are to go on and on and pressing issues at the national level and in the provinces will continue to be ignored. A "Yes" will not be a vote to return to responsible government, but a green light to go ahead with more bickering and distraction.

16.
Forbidding the appointment of senators to the cabinet will mean that there is no one in the Senate to answer for the government's conduct. It will encourage the Senate to adopt a fractious, antagonistic and obstructive position against the government. Denied the possibility of responsible participation in the government senators will act irresponsibly.


All the Senate provisions hobble the national government with restrictions that the provincial governments will remain free of. The provinces long ago rightly abolished their legislative councils and their assemblies do not have to worry about what will pass through an upper house. Provincial appointments are not subject to any confirmation and if they were, confirmation by assemblies in which their governments have a majority would be a sham. But the national government is to be subject to this unique impediment.

17.
The British North America Act simply permits parliament to set up a general court of appeal for Canada. This was done when the Supreme Court was established in 1875. There is no likelihood that the Supreme Court will be abolished. But entrenching it in the constitution will mean that its constitution, its numbers and its organisation will be fixed and only open to change through the painful and damaging process of constitutional negotiation. The enormous burdens already placed on the Supreme Court indicate that its numbers might well be increased. This will be impossible without buying off the provinces.

18.
The traditional appointment of three civil law judges from Quebec has assured that there was always a panel of judges available to deal with cases involving Quebec law, which is based on principles different from the common law of the other provinces and the territories. An entrenched guarantee of one third of the court to a province with only one quarter of the population is undemocratic. It implies that the members of the Supreme Court are to act not as judges but as international arbitrators.

19.
The provision for appointment of judges to the Supreme Court from provincial lists implies that judges should be delegates of the provinces not administering impartial justice but protecting the interests of provincial governments. This will corrupt and undermine the authority of the Court.

As the proposal for interim appointments confirms, the joint appointment of judges by the provincial and the national governments will make appointments political footballs and further disrupt the work of the court and undermine its authority. The court's crucial role, not only in interpreting the constitution, but in assuring the administration of civil and criminal justice throughout the country cannot stand this injury.

20.
If aboriginal people participate fully in Canadian society there will regularly be judges of aboriginal origin who should and will be appointed to the Supreme Court. But as the vagueness of this section confirms there is no way aboriginal representation on the court can be guaranteed. There should be no racial position on the Supreme Court.

This section again demonstrates that a "Yes" vote would be a vote to go on with further distracting constitutional negotiations and that we are being asked to approve a blank contract.

21.
The supposed compensation of Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta for their underrepresentation in the Senate by extra seats in the Commons is a fake. It would do nothing more than give them the extra seats due them because of their growing populations a few years early. After the 1996 census all provinces except Quebec and Prince Edward Island will have the number of Commons seats their population entitles them to. So there will be no compensation to Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta for their underrepresentation in the Senate and in the Senate and the House of Commons sitting jointly.

Quebec has about 25% of the population of Canada now. But it is sure to have a continually lower proportion of the population. With all the existing constitutional guarantees for Quebec, and all the more if the special powers in the Consensus Report are granted to it, it should not have a guaranteed representation in the Commons.

Here again the Consensus Report leaves further issues to be resolved. Again a "Yes" will invite further constitutional negotiation.

22.
There should be no racial seats in the Commons. If aboriginal people participate fully in Canadian society there will regularly be members of aboriginal origin elected to parliament. If they are to be governing themselves as proposed in sections 41 to 56, they may not be regularly elected to parliament, but they will have chosen, in the South African phrase, "separate development" and will have to live with the consequences.

23.
Anyone who understands our constitutional tradition knows that a "First Minister" is simply a "first among equals", the chairman of a cabinet collectively responsible to parliament or a legislature for the government's conduct of the nation's or the province's affairs. A "First Minister" has little or no legal power by himself. Of course, in practice premiers and prime ministers have come to hold great political authority. But this is not a trend that should be encouraged or given legislative recognition. Still less should the "First Ministers" be entrenched in the constitution. This sets them up as sovereign princes meeting to decide the affairs of the nation while parliament and the legislatures wait in humble silence to be told what they must do.

The proposal for perpetual First Ministers' Conferences confirms that far from settling national provincial disputes and eliminating duplication, the Consensus Report guarantees that there will be no end to them. It puts another break on the effectiveness of the national government. If the provinces are to have their say in the Senate why should the premiers be regularly summoned together to scold and distract the national government as well?

In a healthy Confederation, First Ministers would rarely meet as a group, as was true in Canada for most of the last 125 years, until the obsession with the constitution began in the 1960's. In the last few years they have become so frequent that First Ministers have for long periods abandoned their chief responsibilities in Ottawa and the provinces for conferences that have become the equivalent of the distractions of foreign travel for a head of state in trouble at home.

24.
The dangers of a Senate role in the appointment of the Governor of the Bank of Canada are discussed under section 15. This section confirms the intention of the politicians to have round after round of constitutional negotiation if encouraged by a "Yes". Further constitutional discussion of the Bank of Canada will injure international confidence in the dollar. This is what the "Yes" promises in the long run.

25.
This provision entitles provinces to take money raised by the national government from all Canadian taxpayers for national programmes and spend it as they see fit so long as it is in some indefinite way "compatible with national objectives". The Consensus Report again fails to define what would be "compatible" inviting further bickering between the national and provincial governments. Most of the issues will end up being resolved by the Supreme Court, which will be made a political arbitrator rather than a court of law.

The dangers of arbitration by the Supreme Court would not be lessened because First Ministers would be given a supervisory role over shared cost programmes. The development, financing, reform and termination of shared cost programmes would become a three ring circus between the national government, the First Ministers and the Supreme Court, with some provinces, Quebec almost always, opting out of the programmes, but still having their say in them through members of parliament and senators, judges on the Supreme Court and their First Ministers.

Any provision that separates responsibility for raising money from responsibility for spending it is vicious. Like most of the provisions of the Consensus Report this one weakens the national government to buy off the provincial governments.

26.
The provision to provide constitutional protection for intergovernmental agreements would mean that once the national government has agreed to raise money from Canadian taxpayers for programmes administered by the provinces it could no longer control expenditure on those programmes. The ability of the national government to control its expenditures and its responsibility to Canadian taxpayers for the money it takes from them would be broken. Canada's government would become an indentured servant of the provinces, who could spend without taking responsibility for the resulting taxation.

Such agreements would be required for most of the subjects of sections 25 to 39. The legal text repeatedly says that the Government of Canada shall negotiate and conclude within a reasonable time an agreement with a province requesting one. If it does not it risks having one imposed by the courts. Whatever agreement was negotiated or imposed it would have to be done over all again in five years. These provisions require the perpetuation of intergovernmental negotiations and haggling.

27.
Immigration is necessarily a national responsibility. But the legal text says that the Government of Canada shall conclude an agreement with any requesting province for the admission of aliens to that province. As anyone admitted to any province has the right to live and work anywhere in Canada this provision is absurd. Yet these agreements once entered into would have something of the character of constitutional amendments and the national governments power would be given away province by province.

The provincial governments should have no role in immigration unless they simply want to promote the attractions of their provinces by publicity, which they are perfectly free to do now.

28.
Every analyst of unemployment insurance emphasises the need to coordinate it with labour market development and training. But the Consensus Report would break that link by requiring the national government to continue pouring out money for unemployment insurance while having no role in assuring that the unemployed can return to work. National spending on "job creation" or make work projects, the most wasteful labour market spending, is to be protected, but the coordination of this with training and improving productivity is to be broken. The provincial governments will be allowed "to constrain" Ottawa's spending on labour market development and training, but this does not mean that they will impose fiscal responsibility. It means that they will take the money and decide themselves how it is to be spent.

How exactly all this would work is again left to "political accords" and the courts. What is certain is that the national government will be weakened again by being required to raise taxes without the means of controlling the expenditures.

29.
Any government responsibility for culture should be to assist in our national understanding and achievements and our understanding of each other. It is an essentially national responsibility and there is no justification for trying to give the provinces an exclusive jurisdiction in culture. The proposal is incoherent and incomprehensible and at best unnecessary. The provinces already have a large and unrestricted role in culture and this provision will only restrict the national government in some way to be sorted out by the courts, if not by further constitutional negotiations.

The impetus behind this provision is Quebec's national ambitions. Quebec will expect Ottawa to retreat from any cultural activity in Quebec and the other provincial governments are happy to look for any opportunity to enhance their powers at the expense of Canada. If culture in Quebec is left to the Quebec government the separateness of Quebec will be encouraged.

30.
Forestry is largely within provincial jurisdictions now under the British North America Act . The division of powers under the British North America Act has been practically and sensibly settled in the 125 years since Confederation by the courts. Any changes now will not clarify but confuse and unsettle the division that has been settled in the last 125 years.

To make forestry an exclusive provincial jurisdiction would deny the national government an important tool in environmental policy. The national government must have a role in environmental policy and, given the interconnectedness of forests and other parts of the environment and the national scope of the issues, making forestry an exclusive provincial jurisdiction would be destructive and provincial in the worst sense.

The provision for agreements between the national and provincial governments contemplates that the national government be tied down to continuing financial obligations for forestry while losing control over the spending. With this and the following five sections the national government is to be stuck with indefinite continuing responsibilities while losing power to the provincial government. We would have government by intergovernmental negotiation beyond democratic responsibility at either the national or the provincial level.

31.
Mining too is now largely a provincial responsibility. Making it "exclusive" will not clarify but confuse the settled division of powers. Strictly excluding the national government from mining will hamper in its environmental, health and economic responsibilities.

32.
Making tourism, the most important parts of which are interprovincial or international, an exclusive provincial jurisdiction is preposterous. Is the national government to be forbidden to advertise the attractions of travel in Canada or to offer information and assistance to tourists or to regulate airlines and other common carriers in order to promote tourism?

33.
Housing falls largely within the provincial jurisdictions now. The principal exception is the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation. This plays an important role in financing housing and the financing of housing as affected by economic and tax policy is the most important part of housing policy. If the provinces are really to have exclusive jurisdiction over housing the national government should be out of this entirely. The principal residence capital gains exemption is perhaps the most important national housing measure and would have to be abolished. If this provision does not mean that, and it probably does not, it is not a clarification but a confusion of jurisdictions to be negotiated and litigated in the years to come.

34.
The national government's responsibility for international sporting competition, national health, travel and competition policy would be undermined by making recreation an exclusive provincial jurisdiction. Unless the national government is going to abandon these areas completely the exclusive provincial jurisdiction will not be clarifying but confusing and distracting.

35.
Municipal affairs are already an exclusive provincial jurisdiction. What exactly is meant by urban affairs will have to be negotiated and litigated in the years to come, but certainly many "urban affairs" raise national issues that require national solutions and the constitution should not bar the national government from seeking them. Crime and ethnic relations and population distribution and the balance between cities and the countryside are all urban issues that need to be addressed nationally.

36.
The national government is to be forced to enter agreements with any province that asks for regional development. Regional development is not to become a separate head of power under the Constitution because the provinces want to be able to force the national government to spend on regional development without taking responsibility for raising the money themselves. This provision gives the provinces a right to demand handouts, for what has very often been scandalously wasteful spending.

37.
Telecommunications is an inherently interprovincial and international field. The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that the provinces have, rightly, no role in telecommunications regulation under the existing division of powers. What the proposals call agreements "to coordinate and harmonise" would be agreements to confuse and detract from the national government's responsibility.


Sections 27 to 37 all pass power from the national government to the provincial governments. They unsettle and confuse the division of powers rather than avoiding duplication and overlap as the government's supposedly objective information campaign dishonestly pretends. While passing power to the provinces they stick the national government with financial responsibility subject to provincial government control. The national government, left with responsibility without power, will be severely weakened.

Sections 25 to 37 allow for the development of a patchwork Confederation in which different provinces join in some programmes and not others, but they all take the money and all keep their full influence in the national government through parliament, the Supreme Court and the First Ministers' Conferences. Quebec would keep its specially protected disproportionate influence in the House of Commons and the Supreme Court, while dropping out of the maximum number of national programmes building up the jurisdiction it has sought under the name of special status piecemeal. This is what Robert Bourassa has promised Quebec nationalists in selling the Consensus Report. He will be helped in his task because sections 25 to 37, like the rest of the constitution, will be interpreted in light of the distinct society clause.

38.
The powers of disallowance and reservation were little used even in the first decades after Confederation and have been unused now since 1943. Politically they are unlikely to be used except in extraordinary circumstances. But since Confederation they have expressed the principle that the provincial governments are servants of the national interest as much as the national government and at the limit subject to it supervision. The repeal of these powers effectively creates in the provinces sovereign states, which through the Senate, the Supreme Court of Canada and a maze of intergovernmental agreements will supervise the national government in the interests of the provinces. The provision sets the seal on a policy of sovereignty association, adopting for the whole country much of the Parti Québecois' policy for Quebec.

39.
The declaratory power has been used to declare that the development of atomic energy and the St. Lawrence Seaway are for the advantage of Canada. It is an important tool in the national government's responsibility for national development. Requiring the agreement of provinces to its use undermines national responsibility and makes the national government subservient to the provincial governments, as the Consensus Report consistently does.

40.
Whatever the constitution of Canada and whatever the powers of the national and provincial governments, aboriginal peoples should be subject to them with all other Canadians. No question arises from the division of powers of derogating from rights of aboriginal peoples. The "protection measures" simply suggest that they should be exempt from the constitution. The next 16 sections allow us to peer into the dark future where the aboriginal peoples are to be lead off into separate development at the expense of Canada and their own right to join with all Canadians in a just and prosperous society.

41.
The material and social deprivation of many aboriginal people in Canada is the most pressing social and historic issue in Canada. It must touch the conscience of all Canadians. Most Canadians understand this and their keenness to see the issue generously addressed has been expressed in polls showing strong support for aboriginal self-government. But the support is misguided and based on a lack of understanding of what self-government must mean. Among the aboriginal peoples' leaders the demand for self-government is naturally nearly unanimous as it would mean power for those leaders, guaranteed to be big fish in many little ponds.

Though the provisions for aboriginal self-government are the largest part of the Consensus Report, they are also the most uncertain. They leave the concrete meaning of self-government to be settled by further negotiations. "Yes" will mean more constitutional negotiation. As people come closer to understanding what it may mean opposition will grow.

Self-government will mean an internal separatism that will seriously damage Canada. But the aboriginal peoples themselves will suffer most from it at a time when they should hope at last to be brought in from the margins of Canadian society to which history and prejudice have consigned them.

There is no "inherent right to self-government" of the aboriginal peoples beyond what they share with all Canadians. The proposals do not recognise such a right but offer them internal separation in a dead end that will be dependent on subsidies from the rest of Canada.

There is no room for a third order of government in Canada. The provinces and the nation may be two, but will aboriginal people, who are certainly Canadian citizens, also be citizens of the respective provinces, or will they have little provinces of their own? Will their self-governing jurisdictions be carved out of the national or provincial powers?

The "authority" described for the aboriginal governments is completely novel and has never been dealt with by the courts:
a] to safeguard and develop their languages, cultures, economies, identities, institutions and tradition; and,
b] to develop, maintain and strengthen their relationship with their lands, waters and environment
so as to determine and control their development as peoples according to their own values and priorities and ensure the integrity of their societies.
These might be the powers of sovereign national governments. They are broader than the powers of either the national or provincial governments, or even of the two levels of government combined. The Canadian national and provincial governments must accommodate a variety of peoples, values, cultures, identities and traditions. The aboriginal governments are to be licensed to pursue national goals beyond what is permitted to Canadian governments. This supernationalist conception of government is being rejected around the world and even moderate nationalists reject it. But it is to be entrenched in Canada.

Section 41 assumes that it is so obscure that it will have to be worked out in "courts or tribunals" and that negotiations will be constantly required to accommodate these aboriginal statelets in Canada. But the Canadian people will have no control through their democratic institutions. The courts will dictate. The arguments and friction and ill-will will be endless.

42.
Delayed justiciability means that "the inherent right of self-government" is to be entrenched, decided blindly now and by this years' politicians, when there is no agreement what it means. Politicians, including the aboriginal politicians who speaking for themselves claim to speak to for all aboriginal peoples, will have five years, after Canadians have said "Yes" to a blank contract, to see if they can agreed what it means. After that we will be subject to the untrammelled dictatorship of the courts, with the politicised Supreme Court telling us what it all means.

43.
The Charter applies now to all Canadians governments. To say that it should apply immediately to governments of aboriginal peoples should not be necessary. It is an attempt to preempt criticism that aboriginal self-government will detract from the rights and freedoms of Canadians, in particular aboriginal Canadians. But if aboriginal governments are to be established on the premise that everything about aboriginal peoples is different and must be preserved, as section 41 implies, saying the Charter applies means nothing. It is how the Charter would apply that matters, and how it would be affected by the extravagant autonomy granted to the aboriginal peoples. Section 2 has already exempted the aboriginal governments from the Charter for the protection of their languages, culture and traditions.

Granting aboriginal governments the right to resort to the notwithstanding clause confirms that they are to be sovereign governments beyond the control of the national or provincial governments and free to cast off the supervision of the courts when it inconveniences them. When the Consensus Report says "conditions... appropriate to the circumstances of Aboriginal peoples and their legislative bodies", it means: "We don't know what we are talking about, but don't ask questions and say "Yes!" when we tell you to."

44.
Nobody knows now where aboriginal land claims will end. This provision seems to say that the aboriginal self-government will not concede new land claim rights. But "except as provided for in self-government agreements." takes back what the rest of the provision offers. We should not be agreeing to any self-government provisions, until the extent of land claims has been settled. Until the extent of land claims has been settled we cannot know how much of Canada and we are going to separate.

45.
Aboriginal self-government as a constitutional right, as opposed to native administration of reserves under national legislation, is a bad thing and should not be negotiated. But the "Commitment to Negotiate" confirms that there is no agreement on aboriginal self-government, only an intention to continue constitutional negotiations indefinitely in a context in which as much as possible has been done to limit the ability of the national and provincial governments to protect Canada against the consequences of aboriginal separatism.

46.
Even the process of negotiation has not been agreed to and we are just being asked to say "Yes" to its going on and on as long as the aboriginal politicians and the national and provincial politicians bored with carrying out their real responsibilities see fit.

The "Provision for Non-Ethnic Governments" in seeking to be reassuring grants that non-aboriginal peoples living in aboriginal territories may be without rights. Self-government agreements "may provide for self-government institutions which are open to the participation of all" but they do not have to. Most will not.

"The Non-derogation Clause" means that the negotiations may be meaningless anyway and the native politicians and the courts can work out the meaning of self-government between themselves leaving the Canadian people and their elected representatives out of it.

47.
This section confirms that aboriginal peoples are going to be taken outside the laws of Canada and it provinces. The saving provision in the second paragraph demanding consistency with what is "essential to the preservation of peace, order and good government in Canada" is completely undermined by the last sentence, which confirms that the aboriginal peoples are to be exempt from Canada's laws.

48.
This section only confuses the existing law and constitutional provision and invites the aboriginal peoples to insist on their own self-serving interpretations of treaties and agreements.

49.
That all aboriginal people have access to the aboriginal rights that pertain to them is on the face of it saying something that does not need saying. What it does raise is the fact that there is no definition of aboriginal peoples in the Consensus Report or the Constitution Act. So we are being asked that undefined special rights be guaranteed to an undefined class of Canadians. By a process of self-selection Canadians will be chosen to exploit and be subject to the mess of rights and privileges that these proposals may lead to.

50.
The aboriginal governments are to be the most powerful within their territories of any in Canada, but they will not raise the money the programmes to fill their jurisdictions will require from their own people. The national and provincial governments are to raises taxes from the non-aboriginal peoples and hand the money over to the aboriginal governments with no control over how it is spent. The aboriginal governments are to be entitled to demand whatever they want to provide first class services, or at least to maintain high levels of government expenditure in their territories, without any responsibility to see that it is well spent or to make their territories self-supporting. It is accepted that the aboriginal territories will be self-governing but never self-supporting.

51.
The aboriginal governments are to be encouraged to play favourites among their peoples in the name of affirmative action and to favour those amongst their people who put their own culture above Canada's and their common humanity.

52.
Though granting aboriginal separation, the Consensus Report does not know how to protect aboriginal women from their sovereign governments and leaves it to further negotiation asking the Canadian people again to sign a blank page.

53.
The constitutional conferences are to go on into the next century.

54.
Aboriginal rights used to belong to legally defined status Indians. Now they are to be extended to an undefined, indefinitely larger group, which has mysteriously grown by hundreds of thousands in recent years as the material advantages of aboriginality have appeared.

55.
The Métis Settlements General Council's ownership of land should be the same as that of any other Canadian's or Canadian institution's. It should not be a matter for constitutional protection.

56.
There is no Métis Nation and never was. But they are to get all the privileges of the aboriginal peoples. Power without responsibility in self-government, the right to money raised from Canadian taxpayers to spend on themselves as they see fit.

57.
The extent of the changes proposed now and the uncertainty of their meaning requires that amending the constitution should become easier so that when the impracticality and injustice of much of what has been agreed to now is realised changes can be made without the protracted and destructive negotiations of recent years. But having scribbled out the Consensus Report in a couple of weeks of haggling it is to be written in stone, unchangeable except by unanimous consent in all the most important respects. This will either mean that we are stuck with the mess made in Charlottetown until the country dies from it or that we will have no end of constitutional negotiation.

58.
The national government is to be free again to create new provinces, in name. But the constitutional reality of provinces with their full powers under the rewritten constitution is to be subject to the veto of any existing province. If the territories are made provinces they will still have only one senator each.

59.
This section provides that provinces can decide individually how much of Canada they want and take money rather than participating in national programmes.

60.
Having granted indefinite separation to aboriginal peoples, to be paid for by the rest of Canada, we are to agree that any changes to the arrangement, which will largely be worked out by the courts, will be subject to aboriginal vetoes. We had better know what we are getting into, as we are not going to be allowed to get out of it.

The Consensus Report ends by listing several important issues on which the negotiators are resolved to go on negotiating if they get a "Yes". "Yes" means constitutional negotiations for ever.


ENTRENCHING DISUNITY

Canadians have been governed under a largely unchanged constitution since 1867, with about as much success as humans can hope for from government. Many millions of dollars are being spent by our government in 1992 asking us to celebrate 125 years under this constitution. Confederation was an historic innovation, but the structure of responsible parliamentary government that it carried on is a necessary element in Canada's identity. Canada exists because it rejected American constitutional innovations. Responsible government was explicitly formulated in Canada in the 1840's in an achievement that was historic for the whole British Empire.

Now our politicians are asking us to reject the constitution that has served us well for 125 years and largely to reject responsible parliamentary government in order to adopt parts of the American constitution. In place of the genuine compromise of 1867, in which the ambition of creating a new transcontinental nation was married with the need to protect the interests of the existing provinces, they are abandoning national government and granting sovereignty association to all the provinces, which are to act freely without regard for the nation or each other within largely increased jurisdictions. Canada's government will be primarily a tax collector for the provincial governments with little control over how the money it raises is spent. Even within the restricted powers left to it Canada's government will not be free to act but subject to provincial supervision in the Senate and obliged to negotiate most of what it does with the provincial premiers and submit it to the arbitration of a Supreme Court controlled by provincial politicians.

If the "Yes" wins, Canada will have the weakest government of any state claiming to be an independent country. The European Commission will have more power throughout Europe than Canada's government will have in Canada. The provincial premiers will have more power in each of their provinces than the President of France or the Chancellor of Germany have in their respective countries. The Consensus Report does not promote national unity. It entrenches disunity.

QUEBEC
We have been told since Meech Lake was negotiated that something had to be done for Quebec so that it would "sign the constitution" or "become part of the constitution". This is completely untrue. Quebec is "part of the constitution". No province signs the constitution. The government of Quebec in 1982 did not approve the changes made then, but it was a government of the Parti Québecois, founded to break up Canada, and would not have approved of anything acceptable to the rest of Canada. Quebec's approval was not legally necessary. Politically and morally it was not required when the changes made to the constitution were being proposed by a government of Canada led by Quebeckers and with the solid support of 90% of the members of parliament from Quebec.

There is only one thing that could give any sense to the desire to have Quebec "part of the constitution". It is that Quebec should explicitly and irrevocably renounce its claim to the right of self-determination. This is not going to happen. Québecois politicians are unanimous that Quebec has a right of self-determination and would still have it if all its constitutional demands were met. Robert Bourassa has confirmed this. He says a "Yes" involves no risk. Quebec will keep all its options. In trying to accommodate Quebec the rest of Canada is always offering something for nothing.

If the "Yes" wins and the changes proposed to be made to the constitution come into effect next July 1, Quebec will be saying that Quebec is entitled to walk out of Canada on July 2. Mr. Bourassa and his supporters will say that it is not likely to. But there will be no binding commitment to Canada to match the binding commitment to Quebec in the Consensus Report.

Though the whole purpose of the constitutional negotiations was supposed to be to accommodate Quebec, most of the Consensus Report has nothing specifically to do with and is not wanted by Quebec and so makes accommodating Quebec more difficult. While the other nine provincial governments and Ottawa were amusing themselves with Senate reform, a social charter and aboriginal self-government, it was ironically only in Quebec that the alarm bells began to ring as the impractical mess that the rest of Canada was devising began to appear. Quebec will only accept this mess if it believes that a strong government in Quebec and a strong national leadership can get what it wants out of Canada, however badly governed the rest of Canada must be.

The effort to accommodate Quebec in the Consensus Report has been done completely the wrong way. Quebec's essential demand has been for largely increased powers for its government. As a pragmatic concession to Quebec some compromise with this demand may be possible. But the Consensus Report concedes no powers to Quebec that it does not concede to the other nine provinces. The effort to accommodate Quebec becomes a comprehensive dismantlement of the national government. Under the pretence of denying special status to Quebec the other nine provincial governments help themselves to the powers of the national government and generalise Quebec separatism.

But after all Quebec is given special status, in the distinct society clause, in its guaranteed seats in the House of Commons, in the control over language and culture through its senators. A concession of special powers to the Quebec government would have left it free in some measure to follow its own course. The special powers of Quebec in the national government will be exploited as levers by Quebec to get in practice the powers that it is not formally granted in the Consensus Report. The result will be continuing tension and ill-will.

It is a mistake to believe that there is a constitutional formula that will put an end to the tensions between English and French that Canada has lived with and managed for 200 years. Those tensions can and must be managed for another 200 years. But the Consensus Report would make the job more difficult and contentious and by its weakening of Canada erode the will to make the effort. And when, after its application it was seen that the disputes that were supposed to be ended were continuing more distractingly than ever, there would be a growth of ill-will on both sides that could lead finally to separation.

The rise and decline of separatist sentiment in Quebec is largely independent of constitutional politics. The surge of support for separatism in 1990 and 1991 was only partly a result of the failure of Meech Lake. It fell off in 1992 quite independently of the specific offers to Quebec in the constitutional negotiations. So that Mr. Bourassa by August believed that he could persuade Quebec to accept something far less than what it had demanded in the Allaire Report or the Belanger-Campeau Commission. So changeable is Quebec's mood that today Quebec can be content with the constitutional status quo so long as the defeat of the Consensus Report is not seen as a "rejection of Quebec", as the politicians in 1990 contrived to make the failure of Meech Lake appear. But if the "Yes" wins Robert Bourassa has proclaimed that Quebec will go on demanding all that it has ever claimed using the levers given it in the Consensus Report to extract what it wants in future negotiations.

NOT A CANADIAN COMPROMISE

We are asked to say "Yes" to the Consensus Report because it is a compromise and compromise is essentially Canadian. But the mess of the Consensus Report does not result from compromise. It results from trying to promise something to everyone who grinds his axe loudly. What is called compromise in the Consensus Report is not finding the middle ground between opposing positions. Usually it substitutes ambiguity for compromise. In other places it trades off one unacceptable minority demand for another.

Most Canadians do not want to give Quebec special status. Most Canadians would prefer to abolish the Senate. But the politicians have agreed over the heads of the people that Quebec can have what it should not have if a few Western politicians get something like the Triple E Senate we do not want. We are then asked to say "Yes" under the threat that, if we do not, the politicians will break up the country.


Despite the relentless propaganda paid for with unlimited taxpayers money and the lies and scares of the "Yes" campaign, the polls show a healthy resistance by Canadians across the country. A "No" vote will not be a rejection of Quebec or Canada. A "No" vote will be an affirmation of our faith in Confederation as it was wisely formed 125 years ago and in the Canada that has prospered in freedom under the constitution adopted then. We will vote "No" for Canada's sake.




Wednesday, July 1, 1992

THE DISINGENUOUS HOWL - The Fantasy of Libel Chill


July 1, 1992,  The Idler

Canadian writers have been advertising Ontario as a welcoming forum for international figures wanting to bring a libel action. The claims they make are largely false. The two cases that have tested them, Bahamiam Premier Lyndon Pindling's action against NBC and sprinter Carl Lewis' action against Der Stern have lead to nothing. In truth Ontario libel law is perfectly unexceptional and unexceptionable. It is the whining about it that is egregious.

A mere handful of actions in the last couple of years provoked an outbreak of media concern and protest over an alleged libel chill in Canada. None of the actions had its merits passed on by a court. Protesters could not point to a politically or morally defensible publication that had proved legally indefensible. It was alleged nonetheless that libel law chills the ardour of the press for a free accounting of the conduct of public figures. No evidence of the chill was produced beyond the actions themselves. It was not defeat in court but the possibility of being sued that provoked. A group of "Writers to Reform the Libel Law", including defendants in three of the actions, produced a brief entitled A Dangerous Silence calling for major changes to the law. They wanted writers and publishers to have practical immunity from libel actions.

In the law of defamation the principles of free speech meet the rights of persons. Libel is the more important part of the law of defamation. It applies to written publications and broadcasts. Slander applies to mere talk. Defamation is any publication that causes a person, in the conventional phrase, to be held up to hatred, ridicule or contempt. The law of defamation does not protect persons' feelings but their reputations. There is no doubt that a libel can cause serious injury. Writers will not make light of the power of words.

Much of the controversy over the law of libel arises from a presumption of law that any defamatory publication is false. This presumption has lead to the protest that a defendant in a libel action is guilty until proven innocent. This is a false analogy with criminal law. It would be fairer to reverse the analogy and say that writers and publishers who want to put an onus on plaintiffs to prove that the defendant knew that a libel was false want a rule that anyone hauled before the court of public opinion by the media is guilty until proven innocent.

There is no unfair burden of proof in a libel action. The presumption that a libel is false is rebuttable. Truth is a complete defence. The burden of proof is only on the balance of probabilities, not beyond a reasonable doubt as in a criminal prosecution. That the onus is on the defendant to prove truth means only that where a jury is undecided on the evidence whether a libel is true it should find for the plaintiff on the presumption that it is false. Cases where the evidence will seem so evenly balanced and the onus matters are rare. A plaintiff who launched a libel action relying on the onus without strong evidence of his own to overcome any evidence the defence might lead would be ill advised. Conversely any writer or publisher wanting to defend a well researched article should plead truth and defend confidently. Where the presumption that a libel is false matters is in saving a plaintiff the burden of proving a negative, of disproving a libel published by a defendant who would rely on an effective presumption of truth under a law reformed to the taste of the chill lobby. What reformers want is to be able to publish with impunity libels they have no grounds for believing, so long as they neither actually know them to be false nor have some provable ulterior motive for attacking the plaintiff.

Truth is not the only defence. Apart from arguments about whether a publication refers to the plaintiff or means anything harmful, a defendant can plead fair comment on a matter of public interest. On this pleading part of an offensive publication can be defended not as true but as fair comment on facts that are true. Fair comment can be "in the most hostile spirit and in the severest terms" and may "denounce [a person] as unfit for his position for want of such qualities as wisdom, judgment, discretion or skill...".

The three defendants among the "Writers to Reform the Libel Law" were Elaine Dewar, the author of an article in Toronto Life that was the subject of an action brought by the Reichmanns and Olympia & York, Ron Graham, a passage in whose God's Dominion was the subject of an action by Conrad Black, and Heather Robertson, whose attack in Canadian Forum on Allan Gotlieb and his appointment as Chairman of the Canada Council was the subject of an action by Gotlieb against Robertson and the Ottawa Citizen, which reprinted the attack.

The suit against Robertson, implicating Canadian Forum, the traditional organ of the Canadian literary left, produced the sharpest reaction and lead directly to A Dangerous Silence which was published in the May 1991 Canadian Forum. Robertson herself did well out of the reaction. Gotlieb promptly dropped her from the suit. Far from chilling, the experience seemed to heat both Robertson and Canadian Forum, which persisted in attacking Gotlieb, adding the libel action itself as a further ground allegedly unfitting him for the Canada Council. Nor was there any reason why they should be chilled. Canadian Forum was never sued. Robertson, the author of several successful books, was perfectly capable of defending the action herself. In any event she did not have to as Southam Inc., the publisher of the Citizen, assumed the defence for both. Finally in May 1991 the Citizen published a circumspect "Editor's Note" clarifying the "intent" of its reprinting the attack and the action ended there.

A Dangerous Silence claims that under the libel law of Ontario, "it has become progressively more difficult....to bring forward new ideas, raise new issues, root in the past for the origin and meaning of current circumstances and for clues about the future."

There is no evidence of this. It is impossible that it could be so. The only material changes in the law in generations have favoured defendants. Reforms in the 1950's provided that a libel action should not succeed because a defendant could not prove the truth of all he said, if what he could not prove did not materially injure the plaintiff in light of what he could prove, and that whether comment was fair should be judged on the basis of what facts could be proved, excusing what could not be proved. The application of the law by a populous judiciary with little experience of libel actions has become progressively more lax and indulgent to defendants. Qualified privilege, which will excuse defendants from proving truth, has been confused with fair comment and extended.

The writers are confused and ignorant about the law. They complain that there is no definition of libel and that they "can't have any idea what might give rise to a lawsuit." There is no definition in the provincial Libel and Slander Acts, which make largely procedural changes to the common law for the protection of defendants. But the meaning of libel is well settled in common law. They make the preposterous claim that the law assumes "That there has been a libel or the plaintiff wouldn't have sued."

They claim that "well known" plaintiffs have a much better than even chance of success. Putting aside the obscure qualification "well known", this is surely as it should be. People who do not like what is said about them should not sue unless competently advised that they have a good chance of succeeding. But even at that plaintiffs' successes are hard to find. The Canadian Newspapers Association complacently reports year after year that most newspapers have no expenses for libel and only a handful have paid anything in settlements or had judgments against them. Much of the newspapers' legal expenses result from the big papers' efforts to change the law in the courts. They have had limited success in this because there is no need for change and little in the few cases they face to test the law.

A few apologies and retractions, more or less qualified, and a handful of modest settlements or judgments are little to show from a law allegedly biased towards plaintiffs. The writers themselves concede that judgments are modest but complain of the costs. They make a rather disingenuous argument that libel actions are too expensive for people of modest means. This may be true, but people of modest means are unlikely to have occasion to bring libel actions, not generally being exposed to attacks in the press or likely to be materially injured if they are. Conversely publishers who are unable to afford to defend a libel action are not worth suing.

The title of the brief is based on a contention that because defendants are advised not to comment on the subject of a libel action a dangerous silence ensues. What a defendant should say will depend on the particular defence he advances. If he is confident of the truth of what he published there is no reason why he should hide it. The contention flies in the face of the axiom that all potential plaintiffs must face: that suing is likely before the end to give more publicity to the libel. The pleadings and finally a trial can be freely reported.

The reforms the writers propose are anticlimactic. They want shorter notice periods and the proceedings speeded up. Plaintiffs are usually more keen than defendants to get on with an action. Potential plaintiffs have to be warned of the great delays in any action. Defendants' counsel might not want to be deprived of ways of dragging out proceedings and distracting and dispiriting plaintiffs, often at relatively modest cost. They want libel actions tried by a jury. But libel actions are already tried by juries, except when a defendant does not want it or in actions against the CBC, which benefits from an indefensible Crown privilege.

More importantly the writers want the plaintiff to have to prove "actual damages". This is the measure of damages applied in a case where a newspaper publishes a timely apology. It means that a plaintiff has to prove something like financial loss. As this is usually difficult to do, actions are usually not pursued after an apology. Where there is no apology damages are "at large" and juries are instructed to assume that there must have been some damage and to arrive at a reasonable assessment in all the circumstances. It is not an easy or predictable task but the risk of uncertainty is as much a problem for the plaintiff as for the defendant. As the writers concede, damage assessments are not extravagant. As the law has moved towards increasingly granting damages for intangible, not physical or financial, injuries, mental distress and violations of rights, it would be wrong to deny damages for injury to reputation however difficult they may be to assess precisely.

Newspapers have striven to insinuate a kind of responsible reporting defence. Under this it would be safe to report falsely that someone was a psychopath so long as the alleged psychopath was given an opportunity to respond. They have persuaded judges to accept professors of journalism as expert witnesses to testify that the reporting of an untrue story was fair. A judge accepting such testimony errs. It preempts the role of judge or jury in deciding the issues of law and fact. There is no subject or discipline of journalism in which there can be an expert. That it has happened shows how insecure the law is and the uncertainties that plaintiffs face.

The writers seem to want something like the law made up by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan. This held that the first amendment protection of freedom of speech required in an action against a public official that the plaintiff should have to prove that the defendant published the libel knowing it to be false or reckless whether it was true or false. The rule has been elaborated in subsequent decisions to place the same burden on any public figure defamed by the media. As anyone who is the subject of a publication might be a public figure, by a rough circularity any possible plaintiff in the United States may now have to prove that the defendant knew what it published was untrue and thus have to prove his innocence and that the defendant knew it or did not care.

New York Times v. Sullivan arose in the heated atmosphere of the early sixties civil rights struggle and overturned an Alabama jury verdict in favour of Sullivan, the Montgomery Police Commissioner, for $500,000. For technical reasons having to do with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court its reasoning may have been necessary to overturn the judgment. On the Ontario law of now and then, as the Supreme Court of Canada could finally state it without resort to the Charter, the judgment would have been overturned. The publication did not refer to Sullivan. The judge allowed the jury to confuse compensatory and punitive damages. What was false in the publication was arguably immaterial in relation to what was true. Some of the defendants did not even know their names would be attached to the publication. It is an unnecessary precedent for Canada.

In any event, despite New York Times v. Sullivan, and its elaboration, the American media do not feel free of libel chill. It is their phrase. Actions by William Westmoreland against CBS and Ariel Sharon against Time were fruitlessly pursued to much affected media dismay despite the great economic strength of the defendants. Libel insurance is more expensive in the United States than it is in Canada. The American situation confirms that what only can satisfy the chill lobby is complete immunity.

The Reichmanns' action against Toronto Life raised issues that had nothing to do with the actual law of libel. The Reichmanns' wealth grounded a concern that they could bear the enormous costs of the action themselves and impose insupportable costs on the defendants regardless of the merits.  The $102,000,000 they and their company claimed should not have been a concern. If they had been completely successful they would not have recovered more than a fraction of that amount. The article they complained of was 55,000 words long. Only specific passages were alleged to be libelous, but the whole family history and Dewar's research in New York and Hungary and Vienna and Israel and Montreal and Tangier were evidently to be recapitulated in pretrial proceedings and at a trial. If Toronto Life and Dewar had succeeded at a trial they would have recovered enormous costs from the plaintiffs. The complaint was that Toronto Life could not have borne the costs that long. The action was seen as a kind of litigious terrorism in which the plaintiffs threatened to kill Toronto Life. But the Reichmanns would have injured their reputations more by killing Toronto Life than by letting pass Dewar's interminable account of her far flung researches and their exiguous and ambiguous results, which, however many might have bought her planned book, few would have read and fewer still have drawn any damaging imputations from.

The ability of the rich to pursue actions without regard for the costs or the likely recovery is a notional problem in any area of the law. The only and unacceptable remedies are to bar the rich from the courts or openhanded subsidy of defendants. The use of wealth to crush a libel defendant cannot protect a reputation. Libel actions of the rich are too much reported and with too much sympathy for the defendants.

The Reichmanns in their statement of claim did not simply rely on the presumption the writers find so chilling. It asserted an obligation on the defendants "to carry out a proper investigation" and alleged they ignored "readily ascertainable facts". It positively asserted the plaintiffs' "excellent and 'accepted'[sic] reputations". They appeared ready to do battle with the defendants on some of the ground the press would choose in its responsible reporting defence.

In the end Toronto Life and Dewar published a very full retraction and apology and made substantial donations to charity at the Reichmanns' request. The magazine survives in hard times. Slimming and layoffs result from declining advertising in the posh markets to which it appeals. The financial press has shown no inhibitions, rather the reverse, in reporting and speculating on Olympia & York's much greater financial difficulties. The Reichmanns' family history retains an air of mystery, but it was one Toronto Life and Dewar seemed unlikely to dispel. A curious passage in the apology says "we intended to and believed we had thoroughly dismissed all [allegations and insinuations about the Reichmann family] as we felt there was no reasonable basis for them. We now realise that we did not." It was always difficult to see what exactly they were driving at and consequently what the Reichmanns were complaining about. These obscurities added to the expense and risk for both sides.

Conrad Black's action against Ron Graham and McClelland & Stewart is only one of several he has brought, attracting a large share of the libel chill protest and a demonstration outside his Toronto Street offices. He has never carried an action to trial, generally settling for retractions, including a memorably precise and fulsome one from the Globe & Mail. He took a rather flat apology from Graham and McClelland & Stewart in an open letter published in the Globe. They regretted their ambiguity.

The treatment Black receives in the Canadian media shows no signs of gelid deference. It may be wondered whether his resort to the law of libel has done his reputation much good. There is no ground for thinking that he has succeeded in suppressing any truths. He did not frighten Ron Graham or McClelland & Stewart, who published after he had shown his readiness to sue. But Graham by his association with the "Writers to Reform the Libel Law" has already joined in the simple complaint that writers should not have to worry about the libel law at all. Commenting on the painless disposition of Black's action he said he would not write on Black until the Ontario libel law is changed and pronounced: "The chill is still on." Graham's comments show how the chill is largely self-induced and the alarm self-fulfilling.

The self-fulfilling alarm reached a preposterous extreme early in the year when Macmillan Canada announced it would not publish a book on Edward and Peter Bronfman's tangle of companies after receiving a letter from one of them claiming that portions of the manuscript, unseen by Macmillan, might be actionable. The author, Globe & Mail reporter Kimberly Noble, had already written a series of articles for the Report on Business. The Bronfman companies criticised the articles but took no action. The articles and the book required the careful analysis of complex financial structures. Securities markets have lacked enthusiasm for the Bronfman companies because of the complexity of their finances. There is no interest in writing about them that does not get the facts right. There is no reason to think that Noble's book does not. There is no reason to think therefore that it would expose her or Macmillan to liability for libel.

Macmillan's immediate and public capitulation to the Bronfman's produced what can only have been the intended reaction. PEN Canada president John Ralston Saul gloated over a "classic case of libel chill". Ludicrously, Noble's agent praised Macmillan's "bravery" in exposing the impact of libel chill.

After the incident had been fully exploited Macmillan said it would read the manuscript after all and possibly publish it in the fall. Macmillan will not have to worry about a libel action. It will have to decide whether sales of a book that can only interest and be understood by a few thousand Canadians will be sufficient after the free publicity to support the costs of publication.

The situation in Canada presents a marked contrast with that in England. The writers claim that Ontario suffers under a specially oppressive libel law and has become a haven for litigious public figures. But the Ontario law is essentially the same as that in England and the other common law jurisdictions in the Commonwealth. The operation of the law and its effects are very different.

In Canada judgments for libel are few and modest. In England they are many and often enormous. There were several awards in six figures in pounds in the 1980's. The writers made frantic by Allan Gotlieb's action against Heather Robertson should be thankful they do not face the awful example of Nikolai Tolstoy who was ordered to pay £1,500,000 to Lord Aldington for calling him a war criminal for his role in the postwar repatriation of Cossacks and Yugoslavs. The different operation of the law seems to result from a combination of better understanding of the law by a more concentrated judiciary and bar and the willingness of juries - it is always juries in England - to treat libel seriously and make defendants pay.

But despite an operation of the law that Canadian writers would consider ice age the effect is not at all what they argue it must be. English writers are far more outspoken than Canadian writers. Auberon Waugh, though an unsuccessful defendant in libel actions himself, has not hesitated to call one Conservative minister a pedophile and another an obvious madwoman. Private Eye, the remote inspiration of Frank, despite several libel actions, published more good dirt in an issue than Frank has managed to come up with in years of digging. The most typical product of Canadian journalism is the admiring profile. It was not libel chill that led Toronto Life to run an admiring profile of Patti Starr just months before her name became synonymous with scandal in Ontario politics.

In fact, from carelessness rather than vigour, libels regularly appear in the Canadian media. They are not pursued because their victims do not notice them or do not wish to draw attention to them, because they are true, because politics makes it inadvisable to sue and finally because the burden on a plaintiff, the uncertainty and delay and cost, is too much to bear.

The chill lobby implies there is no burden on a plaintiff, who can simply sit back and rely on legal presumptions until a grovelling apology or a handsome judgment arrives. But the plaintiff generally bears the greater expense and faces the inevitable publicity given to the libel through dispiriting delays and uncertainty in the outcome. His whole reputation and life may go on trial despite principles that should restrict the proceedings to the precise libel complained of. In the most famous Canadian libel trial, Sir Arthur Currie sued a Port Hope newspaper for a gross libel alleging he had wasted the lives of troops under his command in a vainglorious attack on Mons on the last day of World War I. He won. But the strain was such that he collapsed on learning there was to be an appeal, which he was rightly advised had no hope of success, and never fully recovered.

Much of the trouble writers have with the libel law results from a vanity that prevents them from admitting when they are wrong. When they have confidence in their story they should plead truth or fair comment and take their case to a jury, looking forward to a courtroom triumph. When they lack that confidence they should proffer a prompt and fair apology and retraction. In the cases of periodical or broadcast libel, and largely with any libel, an apology and retraction faces the plaintiff with the burden of proving actual damages. As after an apology this is difficult to do, the plaintiff will usually drop the case. The defendant has been put to nominal expense. As an apology and retraction is usually insufficient to remove entirely the damaging imputations of a libel the defendant can console himself with the thought that if there was anything to his story after all, which he may still believe, the seed remains from which the truth may finally sprout.

In the heat of protest it is never allowed whether the outraged defendants believe they cannot successfully defend what they said or object simply to being put to the trouble and expense of doing so. Reading A Dangerous Silence it seems that the writers have received alarmist or overcautious advice. But finally what the writers want is a risk free occupation with no enforceable responsibility. No other profession has this. Doctors, lawyers and engineers are all subject to lawsuits and the press is only keen that they should be held to higher standards. Writers should leave their whining and accept the just risks of their profession. A free press is a necessity. But it will be better if it is a press willing to take responsibility for the injuries it may cause.

Thursday, March 1, 1990

WHO IS THE GOVERNOR GENERAL?


March 1, 1990,  The Idler

Roland Michener The Last Viceroy
Peter Stursberg
McGraw-Hill Ryerson

Jules Léger parle
Jules Léger
Éditions de l'HEXAGONE.

Jeanne Sauvé thought she was Canada's head of state, and said so. Monarchists' protests would not stop her. But her misrepresentation was not simply personal ignorance or conceit. It reflected a dissembled government policy of many years. The resulting misconception has become general and references to the Governor General as head of state are commonplace. It is not surprising that there is a lot of confusion about the Governor General's role and dissatisfaction with how it is being filled. Commentary on Ray Hnatyshyn's appointment revealed more uncertainty about the role he was to play than doubts about his character.

At this moment of succession comes Peter Stursberg's puzzlingly titled biography of Roland Michener, The Last Viceroy, published a few months before his 90th birthday in April. Governors General of Canada have never been called viceroys. In the British Empire the title was reserved for India and, informally, Ireland. And whatever Michener was, he was not the last. But there is some sense to the book's title. Michener was the last Governor General to fill his office adequately, the last to try to play the role straight, as the Queen's representative in Canada. Even the fact that he was the last to wear the Governor General's splendid uniform, in which he appears on the dustcover of Stursberg's book, is a sign of a conception of his role in which he was the last of a line.

The key to understanding the role is the obvious point. Le Monde reporting Sauvé's January 1988 visit to France got it right, if she would not: «représentante officielle du chef de l'État canadien (La reine Elizabeth II)». The Governor General is not the head of state but the representative of the the Queen, who is the head of state. It is on this obvious basis that the role and its execution should be judged.

There is general agreement that separating the roles of head of state and head of government is a good idea. Where it is possible, a constitutional monarchy is the best institution for providing a head of state who combines prestige with detachment from partisan politics. Republics only occasionally provide a satisfactory head of state. Either the president is too closely associated with partisan politics or he lacks prestige or both. He is usually elderly.

Detachment from partisan politics and prestige are both necessary in a head of state. The public, ceremonial role of the head of state is not adequately filled when the office is held by a nonentity. The head of state must be able to occupy the central place in public life against the competition of the more powerful head of government. Only monarchies generally manage to bring this off. Republics can only approach their success in producing a head of state with prestige by risking partisanship and elevating a major political figure to the presidency. The fond hope is to find a great artist, a Vaclav Havel, but this is too rare to serve as a model.

A head of state has more than just a public role. He has a private role in intercourse with the government. It is in this role that he may exercise the rights of the constitutional monarch defined by Bagehot: to be consulted, to encourage and to warn. In exercising these rights, the prestige or authority of the head of state is even more important than in his public role. The successful politician may acknowledge the abstract duty to serve the people. But he knows the people only as an admiring crowd or as tiresome complainers. An effective head of state can enforce humility and a sense of duty in a head of government. Even so strong and refractory a personality as Margaret Thatcher must be chastened by her attendance on the Queen. An effective head of state can make concrete and personal the politician's duty to serve. He should be able to inspire deference in his ministers.

Until after the Second World War Canada got on well with a kind of delegated monarchy. The physical distance of the Queen or King only enhanced the prestige of the Crown, while a dignified, often quite young, British aristocrat, detached from Canadian politics, stood in as Governor General. With the obliviousness that accompanies the fashion for "heritage", the general success of Canada's British Governors General, their enthusiasm, their sensitivity, their youth and the respect and affection that they earned, have been largely forgotten. They appear now only as elderly, faintly ridiculous, blimpish figures in CBC productions.

The British Governors General were not always famous, or even very distinguished, when they were appointed. Several went on to greater things; four became Viceroys of India. Three of them were either members of or married into the Royal Family. Apart from his marriage to Princess Louise the Marquess of Lorne was undistinguished, and at 33 the youngest Governor General, but a distinct success. The Governors General seldom knew much of Canada before they came. Their role was to represent the Crown. Their titles and whatever distinction they brought to the role suited them for that, but there was no pretence that they represented Canadians or filled their roles by some personal excellence or prestige. It was from the Crown that they had their prestige and for the Crown that they received respect. Sure of their role their personal qualities were assets rather than a distraction. Their occasional lack of distinction was no liability. Even Mackenzie King was duly deferential. The resentment at not being top dog that he confided to his diary is evidence of the effectiveness of the office.

By the 1950's Canada's development and Americanization and Britain's decline had ruled out anything but Canadian, and possibly Royal, Governors General. An interesting idea of a Commonwealth trade in Governors General was allowed to die without being tried. Two uniquely qualified Canadians made the transition smooth. Vincent Massey was mocked as snob who made the English upper classes feel like savages, but his long public career and association with the Royal Family, his independence and culture and his readiness to play a role made him a successful Governor General.

Georges Vanier's record as a soldier and diplomat, his remarkable culture and dignity, made him an even more successful Governor General. His age and death in office were hazards of native viceroyalty. Vanier's success has obscured the fact that he was not famous before his appointment, and the jump from his last post, ambassador to France, to Governor General was a long one. His success came not from his prestige or stature, but like Vincent Massey's, from his ability to play the role of the Queen's representative to the hilt. He had a quality of courtliness. As an ADC to Byng and Willingdon he had in a sense been a courtier. His bows to the Queen were magnificent, profound without obsequiousness. The sense that he served the Queen and represented her in Canada was strong.

Michener could not hope to match the exceptional impact of his immediate predecessors. But his success is a better model precisely because he was more ordinary and it could have become routine. His career prior to his appointment was respectable but not outstanding. He had briefly served as a provincial cabinet minister in Ontario after the war. Elected to the House of Commons in 1953 he was a "Tuesday to Thursday" member until, passed over for Diefenbaker's first cabinet, he was elected Speaker in 1957. He served to general satisfaction and acclaim, but by Stursberg's own sympathetic account without distinction, until his defeat in the general election of 1962. The Speakership is a dignified, non-partisan office, important in the sense that a poor Speaker can do a lot of harm, but it is largely a matter of routine and good sense.

Michener's second rank public career resulted partly from a qualified interest in public life. Whenever he could he kept up his law practice and business interests. The same factor gave him a relative independence suitable for a Governor General, which he would have lacked had he been more committed to his public career and more successful in it.

His rise to Governor General owed a lot to his youthful friendship with Lester Pearson. A Rhodes scholar from Alberta, where his father had led the provincial Conservatives and thus earned appointment to the Senate by Borden in 1917, Michener met Pearson at Oxford and played hockey happily with him there. They travelled together in Europe. Michener's friendship with Pearson may both have kept him out of the suspicious Diefenbaker's cabinet and made him an acceptable Speaker. The Speakership gave him the standing and the isolation from partisan politics that set him on his course to Governor General. When Pearson had him appointed High Commissioner to India in 1963 it was with the idea of keeping him ready to be Governor General.

When with Vanier's death in March of 1967 Michener became Governor General for the Centennial Year he had Pearson as his Prime Minister. Owing his eminence to his old friend he could hardly expect deference from him. But Pearson had great regard for Michener and Trudeau, almost twenty years his junior and barely three years in politics when he became Prime Minister, was tolerably respectful and saved his disdain for Michener's successors.

Michener had little intelligent conception of his role. He seems simply to have carried on in the style of his predecessors performing to general satisfaction on the strength of his sense of fitness and conventionality. The less satisfactory performance of his successors shows a need for a better understanding of the role of the Governor General.

Stursberg's book is no help. He has been a journalist for over fifty years and has twelve books to his name, several of them oral history compilations, but he writes poorly. He is unsure how to approach his subject. He refers to him variously as "Roly", "Michener", "Mitch", "Mr. Michener", "Roland Michener" and "Mr. Speaker Michener". There are no references and Stursberg is uncomfortable in the use of his sources. "Michener said" appears on almost every page, presumably referring to some oral history transcript but sounding more like a contemporaneous comment than a prompted reminiscence decades later. The transformation of the amiable ramble of oral history into indirect speech produces a flat and banal text. A better book might have been produced if Michener had written memoirs. His mother's private memoirs give some life to the acount of early days in Alberta. His conventionality and discretion may be much to blame for the weaknesses of Stursberg's book, but in writing one's memoirs one is obliged to try to be interesting. Doing oral history one is let off easy, invited to talk and free to be as dull as one pleases.

It is not clear how far Stursberg's accounts of Alberta, Ontario, and Conservative politics are based on anything more than Michener's reminiscences. They certainly take a Michener line, conventional and slightly Pollyannaish. There is a lot of trivia about Michener's sporting days at Oxford. The sum of his three years at Oxford seems to have been little more than sports and friendship with Pearson. Even the balance of that friendship is doubtful. There are sixty references to Pearson in Stursberg's 231 pages. There are nine references to Michener in the 964 pages of Pearson's memoirs.

Michener's legal and political careers were commonplace and their representative interest is not developed. His campaigns in St. Paul's in 1949, 1953 and 1957 had to contend with the last hurrah of old fashioned electoral fraud but Stursberg's account is too superficial and too discreet to be interesting.

Norah Michener's somewhat hard edged character appears but is glossed over with an indulgent account of her accomplishments. A PhD in philosophy and rather implausibly claimed by Stursberg to be fluent in several languages, Norah Michener had grand and old fashioned ideas about etiquette, on which she published a manual for M.P's wives. It was against her wishes that the curtsy was abolished. Pearson settled the point with Michener just before his installation. The suspicion has always been that Maryon Pearson was not prepared to curtsy to the wife of her husband's old friend. But if Norah Michener was not entirely amiable, she was interesting, and her detailed diaries, not available until 2017, may turn out to be the Micheners' chief contribution to Canadian history.

In light of Hnatyshyn's deficiency in French, Michener's record is interesting. Stursberg stresses his, and Pearson's, ignorance of French. He says that to be a history professor Pearson needed no languages, an odd commentary on Canadian academic standards in the 1920's. He attributes Pearson's enthusiasm for bilingualism to guilt at his ignorance of French. Michener's study of French dated from his embarrassment at having none when asked by Drew to investigate the state of the Conservatives in Quebec in 1949. But his French appears more a matter of application than accomplishment. Before simultaneous translation was introduced in Parliament in 1957 he could not follow speeches in French, and never bothered to read the translations in Hansard. However, starting at about Hnatyshyn's age he managed to acquire enough fluency to keep control of the House of Commons and later to pass as Governor General. His wife's fluency was an asset.

Though Stursberg describes Michener as a "royalist" and quotes him as saying of the suggestion that Canada should become a republic with the Queen only Head of the Commonwealth "I never advocated that", he does not appear as an advocate of the monarchy. He accepted Trudeau's contemptuous musings about the office of Governor General and the Crown with complacency. Trudeau condescended to be interviewed for the book and to repeat his musings.

Michener's successors have illustrated the difficulties of the office. Léger was a career diplomat and civil servant who had spent his life working for politicians, starting in the unwholesome atmosphere of Mackenzie King's office. His highest diplomatic posting was Paris from 1964-8, where he is said to have shown great skill in taking DeGaulle's snubs. He ended up as undersecretary of state, administering Trudeau's bilingualism and cultural policies, before a brief stint as ambassador to Belgium and his appointment as Governor General in January 1974. Having been Trudeau's conscientious servant shortly before his appointment he can hardly have been a figure to whom Trudeau would feel any deference. There was always a suspicion that he was thought suitable for the post because his brother was a prince, of the Roman Catholic Church.

Léger started off badly, not only abandoning his uniform but indicating that he would prefer that decorations not be worn at some formal occasions when he was present. As he was ex officio Chancellor of the Orders of Canada and Military Merit this was odd. But the decorations he preferred not to be worn were mainly won in the Second World War, during which he served in Ottawa.

Léger's stroke six months into his term secured his reputation. His wife Gabrielle filled in for him conscientiously. He struggled bravely to recover but always had serious difficulty speaking and writing. His struggle and carrying on were hailed as an example. But he should have resigned when it became apparent that he would not fully recover. To serve four and a half years of a five year term in an office significantly incapacitated shows little respect for the office and must damage it. Had there been constitutional difficulties during his term, as there might well have been, the country would have been ill served. There is no other office in which he would have been permitted to carry on. No doubt Trudeau was content with the situation.

Léger left a curious posthumous souvenir of his time as Governor General. From shortly after the election of the Parti Québecois government in Quebec in November 1976 until the end of his term he would every few weeks discuss his reflections on the country and his office with Pierre Trottier, an old colleague and friend from External Affairs and subsequently ambassador to UNESCO. Trottier would write them up and Léger would later approve Trottier's record. The result was published early last year as Jules Léger parle. Trottier makes plain that his role was more than that of a stenographer while leaving obscure exactly what it was. But the book can be taken as the fragmentary journal or memoirs that Léger could manage. Though only eighty pages it is a more interesting and much better written book than The Last Viceroy.

Léger writes with a curious mixture of solicitude and detachment. There is an analysis of census statistics on ethnic backgrounds and language, an account of William Davis («souriant plutôt que jovial»), commentary on Quebec and constitutional discussions. These read like reports home from a diplomat on the politics of the country of his posting. There is nothing new in them except to know what interested Léger. There are highly entertaining descriptions of the state visit of President Bongo of Gabon and the surprising turmoil caused at Rideau Hall by the need to give Menachem Begin a kosher lunch.

Léger seems to have had the almost extinct quasi-religious French-Canadian reverence for the Crown, now represented only by the historian Jacques Monet.  He writes of an Ottawa transformed by the Queen during her five day visit in October 1977:

Pour une fois, elle avait une coeur. Pour une fois, elle se sentait capitale....Sa majesté...nous apporter par sa seule présence un moment de sérénité dont nous avions bien besoin en cette période de pénurie d'idées claire autres qu'indépendantistes.

His observations on his office are circumspect. He describes meeting Sir John Kerr in London. He had discussed the 1975 Australian constitutional crisis with Eugene Forsey. He has nice metaphors of tapping a watch to make it go and the bee's one sting for a Governor General's constitutional interventions. He records, without detailing or explaining, the transfer of functions relating to letters of credence and other matters from the Queen to the Governor General. He is pleased that there was a minimum of upset and concludes, wrongly, that the measures have no relation to the future of the monarchy in Canada, which he believes is secure. A few days later he transcribes without comment the exchange between Diefenbaker and Trudeau on the subject in the House of Commons.

Schreyer's very appointment was an injury to the office. The public and private expectation was that George Ignatieff would be appointed. The expectation was not groundless and could easily have been dispelled if Trudeau had wished. His surprise nomination of Schreyer was a typically vain and capricious act calculated to display his will and power. It made the Governor General obviously Trudeau's creature. Trudeau exploited his advantage by showing public disdain for Schreyer. At a notorious dinner with the Premiers in 1980 he snapped at Schreyer to hurry up the meal and ostentatiously walked out before the end. Disdain for Schreyer was a common sentiment. The youngest Governor General since Lansdowne, Schreyer was already languishing as leader of the opposition in Manitoba.  Partisanship was not a major issue on his appointment, as he came from provincial politics and the "third party", but Schreyer did not give up on active politics and seemed to be looking for trouble during Clark's minority government and Trudeau's constitutional push of 1981.

Schreyer was signally unhappy in his public role. He managed to be both pompous and common. He spoke more than he needed and always dully. It must have marked a nadir for the Queen's representative to be pelted with buns at a Press Gallery dinner. A dignified non-partisan position was found for him as High Commissioner to Australia on his leaving office, but still in his early fifties he has toyed with escaping from oblivion by returning to politics, a prospect that would forever taint young Governors General with the suspicion of looking for future political advantage.

Despite ill health Jeanne Sauvé was happier in her public role. But despite her insulation in three and a half years as Speaker, her seven years as a Liberal minister and her husband's four put an end to any inhibition about appointing party politicians, as Hnatyshyn's appointment proves. She settled too comfortably into her fancied role as head of state. She connived at a practice of substituting a toast to herself for a toast to the Queen. A vigorous reorganization of Rideau Hall led to closing its grounds to the public. She would refer to the Queen as "Elizabeth". Presumably she considered her an equal, as one head of state to another.

Mulroney's juvenile extreme of the politician's craving for publicity and centre stage led to a clash with Sauvé over the Shamrock Summit of March 1985. He tricked Sauvé into giving up the Citadel and not showing up to greet the visiting American head of state, claiming that it would be a working visit. He then played host to Reagan at a largely public summit. Sauvé confined her public protest to some light verse at a Press Gallery Dinner. With the general backlash at Mulroney's shameless performance nothing more was indicated. Mulroney was too obsessedly agreeable and Sauvé too emollient for there to be any lasting friction. She left office praising Meech Lake, an unhappy political initiative that must have gratified Mulroney as it must have irritated Trudeau. It earned her a hug from Mulroney on her departure from Ottawa. It is unlikely either man showed her much deference. Each was in particular need of someone to impress upon him that political office does not exist to gratify the vanity of politicians.

With Hnatyshyn, the only insulation from partisan politics is his defeat in the last general election. No doubt he and Mulroney will discuss politics freely but Mulroney can hardly feel any deference for someone he made both Minister of Justice and Governor General. In a less formal role overlooking his deficiency in French would have been a refreshing change from the obsessive bilingualism of Ottawa's hierarchy. But it is a surprising mistake for a Governor General.

Hnatyshyn's installation illustrated the too strong sense of the Governor General's being the Prime Minister's creature and the Liberal-inspired republican misconception of the role. Led into the Senate Chamber by Mulroney, he was then as it were introduced by Mulroney in a speech in which the Prime Minister seemed to be promoting his product. He proclaimed the Governor General
un puissant symbole de la nationalité Canadien...l'emblème de l'unité et la communauté d'interêts de tous les Canadiens et Canadiennes et l'étendard...de notre souveraineté.
He did not say that he would represent the Queen. His formulas described a head of state midway between a president and a monarch. Despite the solemnity of the occasion and the respect indicated for the new Governor General Mulroney could not leave it to him to make any jokes and ended feebly and facetiously with "Sounds good to me." Not surprisingly through all this Hnatyshyn looked unsure of himself. He proceeded through the Parliament Buildings like a gladhanding politician. He is likely to remain unsure of himself in the present, partly calculated, confusion over the Governor General's role.

The search for an ideal Canadian combining prestige, dignity, representativeness and detachment from partisan politics is essentially the republic's impossible search for a satisfactory president. It has been an unnecessary result of appointing Canadians. Michael Valpy in the Globe & Mail, condemning Hnatyshyn as an undistinguished out-of-work politician accepting Mulroney's patronage, listed a variety of implausible candidates. Stephen Lewis's and Trudeau's ineligibility and unfitness should be obvious. But names like Mel Hurtig, Barbara Frum, David Suzuki and Thomas Berger could only be considered jokes were they not solemnly offered by Valpy, who sees himself as a progressive monarchist. The mistake generally made is to try to bolster the office of Governor General by the fame of the appointee.  But no republic manages to assure the prestige of its presidency by the distinction of its incumbents. And monarchs do not have their prestige from their personal distinction. They have it simply because they are monarchs. That is the virtue of monarchy. Monarchies do not fail because monarchs are undistinguished. They fail in general revolutions or, more rarely, because monarchs are exceptionally bad.

Monarchists like Valpy and Jacques Monet fall into a trap trying to support the monarchy by boosting the Governor General, even calling him the head of state. The result is to obscure the Governor General's role as representative of the Queen and to set him up as a president by another name. The Governor General can only draw his prestige from the Crown. It was because he played this role straight that an ordinary man like Michener could make a success of his term. If there is to be any recovery it must be by a return to his model: conscientious, dignified, amiable, without pretension to personal importance, but a sense of what is fit in the office. Only the sense that the Governor General represents the Queen can make him interesting. To give the office a role independent of the Crown is to make it indistinguishable from a presidency. That has been the trend of Liberal policy on the Governor General's role in the last twenty five years. The policy can be most distinctly seen in the obscure story of the letters of credence of Canada's ambassadors.

Letters of credence are splendid old-fashioned documents by which one head of state introduces his envoy to another. They were first used for Canada when Vincent Massey went to Washington as Minister in 1927. King George V hailed President Coolidge as "Our Good Friend" and signed himself "Your Good Friend, George R. I.". When it came to be a question of letters of credence of foreign envoys posted to Ottawa, the King took a punctilious interest. While the American and French Ministers presented their letters of credence to Lord Willingdon in Ottawa, the King insisted that they should be forwarded unopened to him. As his private secretary, Lord Stamfordham, put it to Willingdon:
The Letters of Credence are addressed to the King and in special terms reserved for such communications between Heads of States. But were these Letters to be opened by the representatives of the Sovereign in the respective Dominions, they would be dealt with by someone to whom they were not addressed: and the Head of the State might not unreasonably demur to your suggested process of short circuiting and propose that the Letters should be sent direct to the Governors-General. If such a procedure were adopted it would inevitably result in Letters of Credence for Dominion Ministers to Foreign Countries being signed not by the King but by the Governor-General. This I feel sure you would not   advocate.
A chastened Willingdon, who had thought the procedure "needlessly laborious" replied:
I regret that with a view to convenience, I overlooked a constitutional issue, and will carry out the plan...

There the matter appears to have rested until 1972 when Trudeau took up the course Stamfordham was sure Willingdon would not advocate. In a curious move his office announced that changes had been proposed to the Queen but that, true to the spirit of her grandfather, she had objected, and nothing was done. Five years later the issue was raised again and the Queen was somehow squared, apparently during the visit when she brought such serenity to Ottawa, and when there was such a dearth of clear thinking apart from the separatists. Other functions were transferred to the Governor General from the Queen at the same time, notably those relating to declarations of war and treaties.

Since January 1, 1978 a new form of letters of credence has been used. Not easy to come by, it is an extraordinary document.  It begins "In the Name of and on Behalf of", big and bold, "Elizabeth II" followed by her titles, and then comes, equally big and bold, "Ramon John Hnatyshyn" and his title. From there on the Queen is out of it and it is the Governor General, in the first person singular, who asks the receiving head of state to give credence to what the ambassador may say "in My name". It is now the Governor General who is the receiving head of state's good friend. Government House, otherwise in official documents "Our[i.e. the Queen's] Government House" becomes "My Government House". "In the Name of and on Behalf of" is contradicted by the document itself, which is in the name of the Governor General and was redrawn to make that point. "In the Name of and on Behalf of" correctly describes millions of documents issued and signed over centuries by officers under the Crown, notably governors, without the King or Queen being aware of them. These, including letters patent granting land or appointing Queen's Counsel are entirely in the Queen's name, in the first person plural, and ending with an attestation clause reading, for example, "Witness: Our Right Trusty and Well-beloved Jeanne Sauvé...Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada." This is from one of Sauvé's last documents, a proclamation declaring some Canada Pension Plan regulations in force, executed at "Our Government House" on December 21, 1989. It is not, as it is usually put, a question of who signs the document, but in whose name it is truly drawn.

The whole issue can seem impossibly fine and empty. Trudeau, in answering Diefenbaker's questions on the changes in the Commons in January 1978, brushed aside his concern, claiming that the they simply resulted from the letters patent of 1947 constituting the office of Governor General. Explaining the letters patent to the House of Commons in 1948 St. Laurent had said: "There will be no legal necessity to alter existing practice." No legal necessity had subsequently arisen but Liberal policy on the monarchy had developed. And since the 1960's it has been the Liberals' belief that in questions relating to the Crown dishonesty is the best policy. They have tried to maintain that nothing was meant by any change.

But of course something was meant by changes that were pressed for, against the Queen's extraordinarily revealed objections, for over five years. The Prime Minister's office's press release of December 30, 1977 gives some sense of what was intended:
The changes announced today will consolidate the transfer of authority which has taken place over the last thirty years, and with them the Governor General will discharge on behalf of the Queen all functions of Head of State with respect to Canada.
The changes were meant as the culmination of a programme to build up the role of the Governor General as against that of the Queen. Such a programme defies the fact that the prestige of the Governor General is parasitic on that of the Crown. It sets up the Governor General as a president by another name. The "in the name of" formula can easily be dispensed with. Trimming the top few lines from the form of letters of credence will be a much simpler task than the redrafting undertaken in the 1970's. The programme leaves nothing more to distinguish the monarchy from a republic.

An anonymous "aide" was qoted as saying that the changes were aimed at clearing up confusion abroad, allegedly resulting from the previous practice, about the respective roles of the Queen and the Governor General, particularly when the latter travelled abroad. Foreign officials were said to have had difficulty determining where the Governor General fitted in the diplomatic hierarchy. In fact the new form of letters of credence is highly confusing if "In the Name of and on Behalf of" is taken seriously and there was nothing confusing about the old form. The only possible interpretation of all this is that the foreign officials, and Canadians, are to understand that the Governor General is the head of state. Presumably the new form indicated matching changes in letters of credence for foreign ambassadors posted to Canada, though it may have required some explaining before presidents understood that it was now the Governor General rather than the Queen who was their good friend in Canada and monarchs understood that they only had a good friend here, rather than a sister, under the diplomatic fiction that all sovereigns are brothers and sisters.

The Liberals' thinking was further exposed by Trudeau's first stab at constitution making, introduced as Bill C-60 in June 1978. This established the office of Governor General and vested in it all executive authority "on behalf of and in the name of the Queen" and declared the Governor General "the First Canadian". There was far more about the Governor General than about the Queen, described obscurely as "the sovereign head of Canada", and the trimming necessary to make a republic, which would not have required any change in the Governor General's title or role, would have been slight.

The changes exploit the confused monarchism that calls for a stronger Governor General in the hope that it will mean a stronger Crown while satisfying republicans who expressly see the Governor General as a president in waiting. No practical justification for the changes is possible. By the 1970's passing letters of credence back and forth across the Atlantic must have ceased to be an inconvenience if it ever was. Far from feeling burdened by the task of signing them the Queen was apparently keen to keep it. Rather than passing formal work from Buckingham Palace to Rideau Hall, the ease of communications indicates the opposite course. According to Trudeau, "It is either the Governor General becoming more and more of a head of state or nothing." But if anything the public's respect for the office and its incumbents has declined while his programme has been put into effect.

The Governors General have accepted the programme with all too human complacency. It must have seemed to them a pleasing enhancement of their role. Léger, despite his respect for the Queen, to whom he continued to write after leaving office, was perfectly content to assume her prerogatives, despite her reservations. According to Stursberg, Michener, towards the end of whose term the issue of letters of credence was first raised, "did not really approve", but was "quite prepared to sign...if the government felt that was the best way to do it". It is plain that he did not really disapprove. Vincent Massey saw the issue differently, writing in his memoirs that "It is important that the Sovereign should continue to be directly identified with these matters."

A feature of Michener's term as Governor General was his "state" visits to Caribbean Commonwealth countries and to the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Stursberg introduces the topic with an account of the Queen and Prince Philip encouraging Michener to travel abroad at their meeting at Windsor Castle on his way to his installation. This breach of royal confidentiality is typical of the way in which playing with traditions is given a spurious royal endorsement, from the flag and the 1982 Constitution Act, to Meech Lake, and, although belatedly, the 1977 changes in the Governor General's functions.

An issue is made of Governors General's official visits abroad. It was referred to by the anonymous "aide" in justifying the new letters of credence. The Queen's state visits are usually visits of the Queen of the United Kingdom. Though King George VI went to the United States in 1939 with Mackenzie King in attendance and the Queen's 1959 visit to the United States after the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway had a strong Canadian aspect. But the Governor General's office is to represent the Queen in Canada. In going abroad on official visits is he acting as head of state? Stursberg, and Michener, make much of his having been received abroad with full honours as a head of state. His trips were exploited as part of the Liberal programme, culminating in the affair of the letters of credence. It was not a question of changing the Governor General's role so he could make trips abroad but of his making trips abroad to change his role.

Official visits abroad by Governors General were not unprecedented. They had regularly travelled to the United States. Presidents received them. Would they have time for a Governor General now? Willingdon, Tweedsmuir, Alexander and Massey all received grand official welcomes in Washington. Such trips do not require the Governor General to assume the role of head of state. The protocol can be played either way. Michener's successors have not carried the programme significantly forward. Léger managed to get to Spain. Schreyer and Sauvé made only a few trips abroad, Schreyer managing to take in Roumania, for which we were repaid by a visit from Ceausescu during Sauvé's term. Foreign countries have no interest in a campaign to establish the Governor General as a head of state. And Prime Ministers are too keen on foreign travel themselves to encourage viceregal competition. That is one consideration in favour of such trips, to make the point that Prime Ministers should go abroad to work, not to be celebrated.

The notion that Governors General are important beyond their representation of the Queen has lead to an inflation of their status after leaving office. Retired Governors General have formal precedence after the Chief Justice of Canada. They are apparently entitled to a kind of state funeral and a stamp. The idea of Schreyer and Sauvé stamps is even sillier than a Mackenzie Bowell stamp. There is no likelihood that the British Governors General will be retrospectively honoured with stamps as the dead Prime Ministers up to Bennett were in the 1950's. Leaving Governors General simple private citizens after retirement would emphasise that it is their office of service to the Crown and not their person that is important.

There is no sign that a Tory government intends to reverse the Liberal reconstitution of the office of Governor General or is even unhappy with it. The public is unhappy but Liberal dissembling has so clouded the issues that it cannot understand why. Only the fact that a Governor General who is a president by another name can never be satisfactory gives hope that the office may one day again be understood as part of the monarchy. It may be possible to forget fame and popularity and look at what is really required for the role.

It is more important that a Governor General should be his own man or woman than that he should be famous or superlatively distinguished. Michener, though obviously highly satisfied to be Governor General, was his own man. He could have done without it. But with his four successors the case is different. Léger the civil servant, Schreyer the young politician at loose ends, Sauvé and Hnatyshyn the ex-ministers patronised by the Prime Ministers who had put them in their cabinets, all had the look, and to a dangerous degree the reality, of being their Prime Minister's man. Personal independence and an ability to represent the Crown are the only possible bases on which a Governor General can exact some deference from politicians.

Some connection with or interest in government is a necessary qualification. A Governor General has a role in government and cannot exercise his rights of consultation, encouragement and warning or his exceptional rights in a crisis, if government is strange to him. Any connection with the Royal family, like Massey's, though it may be rare, can help to make effective the Governor General's representation of the Queen. Whether there is any such connection or not a Governor General ought to have an intimate sense of service to the Queen, what Sauvé most notably lacked. The republican, head of state, conception of the role reflected in Mulroney's introduction of Hnatyshyn, or the viceregality of the role can otherwise have a conceiting effect on the ordinary people who must generally be Governors General. Obviously a well behaved member of the Royal family, when one is available, would be ideal.

Finally the Governor General's is very much a ceremonial and formal public role and he must be able to play the role as Massey, Vanier and Michener could and none has since. A Governor General ought to be prepared to wear his uniform without any false simplicity. It is part of his job. It would be difficult for a Governor General to return of his own motion to greater formality and to wearing the uniform but it is worth trying. Canada, which had a dignified but unpompous public formality setting it apart from the United States only a generation ago, now prefers luxury to formality. Michener rather reduced the appreciation of the uniform by designing for himself and too often wearing completely superfluous Commander-in-Chief's uniforms. With Nova Scotia and British Columbia the two happy holdouts, the Lieutenant Governors have gradually abandoned their uniforms and the viceregal turnout for men is reduced to a top hat reminiscent of the Hollywood jungle chief resplendent in top hat and little else.

A full recovery for the Governor General would require a general restoration of our political and public culture and manners. Prime Ministers, and their wives, would have to back away from the ceremonial and patronage activities by which they pollute civic, sporting, cultural and charitable functions. Even when the Governor General is present the Prime Minister insists on sharing centre stage. Politicians would have to show more deference to the Queen's representatives.

Despite his closeness to party politics Hnatyshyn is not unfit to be Governor General. But the script for the role he is to play has been scrambled and several pages are lost. He will receive promptings for the wrong role. If he is to succeed he must go back beyond his three immediate predecessors and study the performances of Michener and those before him, not forgetting his British predecessors. as he did in his installation speech. He can learn from them all. But even Massey and Vanier would be dangerous models, in a style beyond him. Better will be Michener, another Tory son of a senator from the West. And there is still time before his next big scene to get his costume right. Michener's uniform is in the Museum of Civilization in Hull. It must be out of place there. It could fit Hnatyshyn well at his first Opening of Parliament.